Tardos has proposed a randomized fingerprinting code that is provably secure against collusion attacks. We revisit his scheme and show that it has significantly better performance than suggested in the original paper. First, we introduce variables in place of Tardos' hard-coded constants and we allow for an independent choice of the desired false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) error rates. Following through Tardos' proofs with these modifications, we show that the code length can be reduced by more than a factor of two in typical content distribution applications where high FN rates can be tolerated. Second, we study the statistical properties of the code. Under some reasonable assumptions, the accusation sums can be regarded as Gaussian-distributed stochastic variables. In this approximation, the desired error rates are achieved by a code length twice shorter than in the first approach. Overall, typical FP and FN error rates may be achieved with a code length approximately five times shorter than in the original construction.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Digital Fingerprinting D IGITAL content, such as songs, photographs, or movies, can be copied inexpensively without any loss of quality. Moreover, these copies can be easily redistributed without permission from the original rights holders. According to [9] , unauthorized sharing of music on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks in college campuses reduces the potential revenue of the recoding industry by as much as 20%.
One way of countering unauthorized redistribution is to uniquely mark each individual instance of the originally distributed content, so that the recipient (user) can be identified if that content appears on a P2P network. The authorized distributor (or the content owner) embeds a unique mark, also called a "forensic watermark" or a "fingerprint," into each instance of the content before transmitting it to the user. The embedding algorithm ensures that the mark is imperceptible, i.e., the quality of the content is not degraded by the mark. Moreover, the location and nature of the mark is kept secret from the user to prevent him from locating and altering the Manuscript mark. Typically, the mark consists of a set of symbols from a -ary alphabet, where each symbol is embedded into a different part of the content, e.g., different scenes in a movie. When an unauthorized copy is found, the content owner, knowing all the details, can detect the mark and identify the source of the unauthorized copy. Forensic watermarking has already been successfully applied in practice [4] .
B. Collusion Resistance
A group of recipients (called "colluders" or a "coalition") can collaborate to escape identification. Comparing their content copies, they can find the locations where their content, and thus their marks, differ. These locations are called the "detectable positions." By cleverly manipulating the content at those locations, the colluders can attempt to create a version of the content that cannot be traced back to any of them. Such an attack is called a collusion attack.
Collusion attacks and fingerprinting schemes that show resistance to these attacks have been studied since the late 1990s. The often used marking condition assumes that the colluders are unable to change the symbols (marks) in undetectable positions. Under the marking condition, one can distinguish between the following attack models, which differ in the type of manipulation the attackers are allowed to perform.
• The restricted digit model or narrow-case model allows the colluders only to "mix and match," i.e., to replace a symbol in a detectable position by any of the symbols they have received in that position. • The unreadable digit model allows for slightly stronger attacks. The attackers can also introduce an unreadable symbol "?" in detectable positions. • The arbitrary digit model allows for even stronger attacks.
The attackers can put any (arbitrary) -ary symbol (but not the unreadable symbol "?") in the detectable positions. • The general digit model allows the attackers to put any symbol, including the unreadable symbol "?," in the detectable positions. In the case of a binary alphabet, all four attack models are equivalent. The content owner can map the unreadable symbol "?" to either of the binary symbols without loss of generality.
Video fingerprinting applications face a number of severe constraints in practice. First, there is a limit on the number of locations suitable for watermark embedding. A typical fingerprinting system can reliably extract approximately seven bits per minute of video content [5] . Furthermore, constraints on decoding complexity and perceptual quality limit the number of different symbols that can be embedded in each location. Hence, the alphabet size for a fingerprint code is limited (typically ). Finally, mass market content distribution systems need to accommodate a very large number of users (e.g., millions or even hundreds of millions). Under these constraints, the authorized distributor is interested in the fingerprint code that can resist the largest coalition size . In the last decade, various fingerprint codes have been proposed. Some of these codes are deterministic, i.e., they can identify at least one member of the coalition with certainty, without the danger of accusing an innocent user. For instance, identifiable parent property (IPP) codes proposed in [7] are deterministic. However, the scheme is limited to a coalition size of two. In [10] , Staddon et al. proved the existence of a deterministic fingerprinting code that is resistant against colluders. The code is of length , where is the number of users. However, it requires an impractically large alphabet size . Another deterministic scheme, presented in [3] , has a similar length with a smaller alphabet size . Still, the alphabet size quickly becomes prohibitive for mass market content distribution systems.
When the application can tolerate a nonzero probability of error, randomized fingerprinting codes with smaller, even binary, alphabets can be used. In a typical fingerprinting application, the most important type of error is the false positive (FP) error, where an innocent user gets accused. The probability of such an event must be extremely small; otherwise, all accusations become dubious, making the whole fingerprinting scheme unworkable. We will denote by the probability that a specific innocent user gets accused. The notation is used for the probability that there exist innocent users among the accused. The second type of error is the false negative (FN) error, where the scheme fails to accuse any of the colluders. In practical content distribution applications, fairly large FN error probabilities can be tolerated, as the content owner can collect evidence from multiple pieces of content over a period of time. We denote the FN error probability by .
In [2] , Boneh and Shaw presented a binary randomized code with length , which uses concatenation of a partly randomized inner code with an outer code. They also proved a lower bound on the required length for any binary code that is resistant against colluders:
. In [8] , Peikert et al. proved a tighter lower bound for a restricted class of codes with a limited number of "column types":
. In [11] , Tardos further tightened the lower bound for the arbitrary digit model and the unreadable digit model:
for arbitrary alphabets. In the same paper, he described a fully randomized binary fingerprinting code achieving this lower bound. This code has length . While [11] proposed a practical code with optimal behavior for large , it leaves a number of open questions.
• The author uses a number of arbitrary-looking constants in his proofs, such as , , and . Similarly, the constant appears in the minimum code length expression . While these numbers allow for important properties to be proven, it is not at all clear if they have been chosen in an optimal way. • He also makes seemingly arbitrary choices for the accusation weight function-which specifies how strongly to accuse a user per symbol if his symbol is equal to the symbol found in a pirated copy-and the distribution function-which specifies probabilities used in generating the random code words, hinting that they are optimal, but not providing a proof. • In the proofs, the FN error probability is coupled to the FP probability . While Tardos remarks that they can be decoupled, it is not clear how each exactly influences the code length on its own. Furthermore, the coupling is such that FN rate is much smaller than the FP rate . As mentioned earlier, in practical applications, the opposite may be desirable. This opposite case is not studied.
C. Contributions and Outline
In this paper, we provide answers to the aforementioned issues with Tardos' construction, which were left open in [11] .
• In Section II-B, we generalize the Tardos' construction, introducing variables in place of numerical constants and generic functions instead of the functions specified in [11] . We state "soundness" and "completeness" properties, which specify the desired FP and FN error conditions. Our approach is similar in spirit to Hagiwara et al.'s in [6] , but our results are not restricted to small coalitions. • In Section III-A, we state the conditions on the construction parameters for a scheme that satisfies both the "soundness" and "completeness" properties. These conditions are derived in Sections III-B and III-C, respectively. We employ a proof method very similar to [11] , but we specifically do not couple FP and FN error rates. In Section III-D, the results of the preceding sections are combined to arrive at a condition for the code length. • In Section III-E, we show that Tardos' choice for the accusation weight function is optimal. In Section III-F, we show that his choice for the distribution function used in generating the random code words is optimal within a limited class of functions. • In Section III-G, we arrive at the smallest possible code length parameter value, specific for our proof method, that allows for soundness and completeness. In the case of large , this value lies slightly above , which is a significant improvement over the original value "
." • In Section IV, we present the results of a numerical search for model parameters that yield the shortest possible code length. For certain realistic choices of , , , and , we find that the code length can be reduced by a factor of two or more. For large , our theoretical large-result seems to be approached. • In Section IV, we further see that the code length depends only weakly on , as was also mentioned by Tardos. Nonetheless, we observe a significant advantage for decoupling the FP and FN error probabilities. When Tardos' coupling of is enforced, the code length constant "
" can be reduced only to approximately . When the rates are decoupled and the FN rate is allowed to increase, for fixed and values, the constant can be reduced to approximately . We also study the statistical properties of the scheme. The results give us an insight into the "average" behavior of the scheme and are much simpler than the expressions involved in the formal proofs.
• In Section V-A, by modeling the accusation sums as normally distributed stochastic variables [an approximation motivated by the central limit theorem (CLT)], we state a simple approximate condition for the code length based on the coalition size, FP and FN error rates. • In Sections V-B and V-C, we compute the mean and the variance of the accusation sums for innocent users and the coalition, without any assumptions on their distribution. Similarly, we derive conditions on the code length and the accusation threshold based on the desired FP and FN error rates, in Section V-D. • In Section V-E, we identify an "extremal" colluder strategy. It maximizes our expression for the minimally required code length. The strategy is to output a " " whenever this is allowed by the marking condition. • In Section V-F, we assume that the probability distributions of the accusation sums are perfectly Gaussian. Using this approximation, we show that (for large ) error rates and can be achieved with code length . The Gaussian approximation is justified in Appendix III.
II. TARDOS REVISITED

A. Generalization
In [11] , Tardos proposed a randomized fingerprinting code resilient against collusion attacks. His fingerprinting scheme is particularly known for its short code length. Nonetheless, due to a number of implicit parameter choices in [11] , it is not clear if his explicit construction achieves the shortest possible code length allowed by the scheme. In this section, we generalize Tardos' construction in anticipation of our study in the following section. In particular, we make three generalizations. First, we replace various fixed numerical parameters by variables and investigate the conditions on these variables that allows us to still carry out the security proofs. This helps us to modify the system parameters so as to obtain even shorter code lengths. Second, we allow for the desired FP and FN error probabilities to be chosen independently. As opposed to the original construction where these probabilities were coupled, this generalization allows us to better align the scheme to practical content fingerprinting requirements. Third, we do not assume any specific form for the functions , , and (see Section II-B) in Tardos' construction. The introduction of arbitrary functions , , and leads to a lot of extra effort in carrying out the proofs. However, with this generalization, we can show that Tardos' choices for and are optimal (for the proof technique employed in [11] ), and that his choice for is likewise optimal within a specific class of smooth functions.
B. Notation and Definitions
We describe our generalized version of the binary Tardos fingerprinting scheme below. We adhere to the notation in [11] whenever possible. Moreover, we denote the explicit parameter choices made by Tardos by the superscript " " to avoid confusion.
The fingerprinting scheme has recipients (users). Each user is assigned a codeword of length . The set of colluders (the coalition) is denoted as , whereas the number of colluders is denoted as . The coalition size up to which the scheme has to be resistant is denoted as . The content owner generates an matrix ; the th row of is the codeword embedded in the content of user . The part of received by the coalition is denoted as . The colluders use a " -strategy" to produce an -bit string , which ends up in the unauthorized copy. The strategy can be deterministic or stochastic. The content owner uses an accusation algorithm . The output of the algorithm is a list of accused users.
The matrix is constructed in two phases. In the first phase, a list of random numbers is generated, where , with a small parameter satisfying . The are independent and identically distributed according to a probability distribution function . The function is symmetric around and heavily biased toward values of close to and . In the second phase, the columns of are filled by independently drawing random numbers with . Having spotted a copy with embedded mark , the content owner computes an "accusation sum" for each user according to if if (1) where and are the "accusation functions," and denotes the th bit of . The decision whether to accuse a user is taken as follows: if , then accuse user . Hence
We note some properties of this construction. If the received mark is zero, the accusation of user due to column is neutral. If , the accusation sum is updated by , which is a measure of how much suspicion arises from observing for a given and . The function is positive and monotonically decreasing. The fact that user has received a " " in that position, i.e., , adds to the suspicion. Moreover, the amount of suspicion decreases with increasing , as the symbol becomes more probable. The function is negative and monotonically decreasing. Therefore, the fact that detracts from the suspicion, and this becomes more pronounced for large . We impose two properties on the accusation functions and , which become handy during our proofs. First, we want to have the expectation value of the accusation in each column to be zero. Therefore, the functions should satisfy . Furthermore, we want the weights of the accusation for and to be symmetric, since the function also has symmetry. This is achieved by setting . These two properties together imply that 1)
can be computed from according to and 2) on the interval can be derived from on the interval according to . Hence, it is necessary only to specify for . 1 The FP parameter , chosen by the content owner, denotes the desired bound on the probability of having when a fixed user is innocent. The FN parameter , also chosen by the content owner, denotes the desired bound on the probability that does not contain any guilty user. The Tardos fingerprinting scheme uses a code length and a threshold with the following scaling behavior 2 as a function of , , and
Here we have introduced the parameters and , replacing Tardos' constants and , respectively. We want the scheme to satisfy the following properties.
Definition 1 (Soundness):
Let be a fixed constant and let be an arbitrary innocent user. We say that the above described fingerprinting scheme is -sound if, for all coalitions , and for all -strategies false positive (4)
Definition 2 (Completeness):
Let and be fixed constants. We say that the fingerprinting scheme is -complete if, for all coalitions of size , and all -strategies false negative (5) Tardos proved (for ) that his scheme is sound and complete for the following very specific choice of parameters 3 :
where .
III. PROVING A SHORTER CODE LENGTH THROUGH PARAMETRIZATION
A. Main Result
The main aim of this paper is to show that it is possible to satisfy soundness and completeness in Tardos' scheme also with different choices, especially with a smaller parameter and hence shorter code length . While the choice does the job for , we will show that it can be reduced to a number slightly larger than in the limit of large , when is not coupled to . Our results can be summarized in the form of the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let be fixed parameters. Let the cutoff parameter be parametrized as , with . Let satisfy (7) Let be a positive constant. Let the quantities , , and be defined as (8) Let the length and the threshold in the generalized Tardos scheme be parametrized according to (3) . Then, it is possible to find functions and such that the parameter setting (9) achieves -soundness and -completeness. 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the coming sections; we follow Tardos' proof method wherever possible. We derive the conditions for soundness and completeness in Sections III-B and III-C, respectively. We combine these conditions in Section III-D and obtain the lowest possible value of that allows for soundness and completeness, depending on the specific choice of the functions and . In Section III-E, we prove that is the "optimal" choice, independent of , in the sense that this choice minimizes this lowest value of (given the proof method). In Section III-F, we argue that, given , the choice is "optimal" (in the same sense) within a limited class of functions. Finally, in Section III-G, we set and and complete the last step of the proof.
B. Condition for Soundness
This section follows the lines of Tardos' proof of Theorem 1 in [11] . We derive an inequality for the scheme parameters from the requirement that the soundness property holds.
First, an auxiliary variable is introduced for the purpose of applying the Markov inequality. [Tardos uses .]
Here the notation denotes the expectation value computed by averaging over all stochastic degrees of freedom: the (possibly stochastic) , all the entries in , and the parameters . The expectation value in (11) is bounded by using the inequality 4 , which holds for . Using the notation , we can write (12) Here stands for the expectation value over the th row of , keeping the rest of fixed, and keeping and fixed. Note that is independent of since the user is innocent. The inequality (12) holds as long as is so small that for all for which . This is automatically true for those columns where , since is negative. In the other columns, we need . Since and is monotonously decreasing, we can satisfy the inequality for all by setting . Next we further bound (12) . Due to the property , we have . Thus, we can write (13) Note that all dependence on the coalition strategy has disappeared in the last expression. Next we take the expectation value of (13), for fixed , over the remaining degrees of freedom in (all rows except ) and over . This has no effect on the last expression in (13). Finally, we take the expectation value with respect to (w.r.t.) the degrees of freedom. We remind the reader that this amounts to multiplying with the distribution function and integrating over all . For ease of notation, we introduce the functional , defined as (14) (With Tardos' choice for , this evaluates to ). We can then write (15) 4 One may ask why this crude inequality is used when our purpose is to squeeze the scheme's parameters as tightly as possible. The answer is that we do not want to deviate from [11] too much in this paper, as it would lead to even more bookkeeping than is already the case. It would be interesting to determine the consequences of using an inequality of the more general form e < 1 + ru + su , with r 1.
In the last step, we have used , which holds for all . Substitution of (15) into (11) 
C. Condition for Completeness
This section closely follows the proof of Theorem 2 in [11] . We derive an inequality for the scheme parameters from the completeness requirement. First, the coalition's accusation sum is defined
Here denotes the number of colluders that have a " " at the th position of their codeword. (The size of the coalition is . We consider the case .) Since would imply that at least one colluder gets accused, the FN error probability can be bounded by 
Upper bounding the expectation value is an arduous job. The derivation is given in Appendix I. It turns out that , with a numerical constant, provided that , , , and satisfy a complicated condition (88). (Tardos has .) Thus, we can bound the FN probability as (24) Substituting the parametrization (3) into (24), and restricting ourselves to the regime , we get (25)
Next we demand completeness . This yields the following inequality:
(26) Note that (26) is valid only if the complicated condition (88) is satisfied.
D. Conditions on the Code Length
By combining the results of Sections III-B and III-C, we derive a condition on the length parameter that is sufficient for proving soundness and completeness using the current proof technique.
Lemma 1: Let be fixed parameters. Let the code length and the threshold in the generalized Tardos scheme be parametrized in terms of the and parameters according to (3) . Let the threshold be set as , with a positive constant. Let be a fixed integer, satisfying
Let be the auxiliary parameter introduced in Section III-C. Let be the parameter introduced in Section III-C, chosen such that the condition (88) can be satisfied by some value . Let be the functional of and as defined by (14). Let be defined as (28) Then, the generalized Tardos scheme with (29) is -sound and -complete.
Corollary 2:
Let be parametrized as , with a positive constant. Let the function be such that it has the asymptotic behavior at , with . Then, for large , it is possible to achieve soundness and completeness with . Proof of Lemma 1: The value of in (27) is specifically set such that (18) is satisfied, and hence we are allowed to use the inequality (20). By combining the results (20) and (26), we obtain a "window" for in which soundness and completeness are both satisfied
We choose such that 1) this window exists and 2) the left boundary is as small as possible. It turns out that the optimal choice for is the smallest value for which the window still exists. Setting the left and right boundary in (30) equal to each other and solving for gives (31) with as defined in (28). The corresponding value for is .
Proof of Corollary 2: First, we show that the quantity is well defined in the limit of large . To this end, we inspect (88), setting . We start with the term involving (with and ). The exponent , with defined in (82), satisfies
From the choice , with , it follows that , i.e., an increasing function of . Hence, the expression decreases as for some positive constant . For large , this is much faster than the term . Next we look at the term . This can be written as . Hence, the factor multiplying is a small constant independent of .
In the term , the factor multiplying can be written in the form (33) In this form, it is clear that the expression is finite for , provided that the product is nonpathological near . The remaining term in (88) is , where is some nonnegative number that upper bounds the expression as defined in (75). From (75), it follows that
where is defined as the interval (or set of intervals) on which . Using the expression (34) as our bound and computing the -sum, we obtain (35) Expressed in this form, it is clear that this contribution is of order for . The smallness of all the expressions in (88) implies that is well defined.
The last step in the proof of Corollary 2 is the asymptotic behavior of the factor in (29). The fraction in the definition (28) of is equal to , i.e., of order . Consequently, .
Note that the expression in Lemma 1 originates from the specific proof technique.
The next step in the proof of Theorem 1 is to choose and such that the product is minimized. We refer to this choice as "optimal," but it should be clear that it represents optimality only with respect to the proof technique that we employ in Section III.
E. Finding the Optimal Function
Lemma 2: For all distributions , Tardos' choice is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the factor appearing in the length parameter in Lemma 1. This choice yields . Proof: We have to solve an optimization problem and determine where the functional derivative of is zero. This is easiest to accomplish by choosing as the independent degrees of freedom and on the interval , instead of and . From (88), it can be seen that depends on and only through : the expression involves only the product ; and is a bound on (75), which also depends on and solely through the product . The parameter , on the other hand, depends on both the and degrees of freedom; (14) can be rewritten as
The functional that we have to minimize is
where is a Lagrange multiplier for the normalization constraint on . Setting the functional derivative with respect to equal to zero gives (38) Hence, since the normalization of is arbitrary, 5 it turns out that Tardos' choice is optimal. From the optimal , the value of follows directly, without dependence on : substituting into (14) and using the fact that is a normalized probability distribution, we get .
F. The Choice Seems to be Optimal
Having found the optimal , we can next search for the optimal distribution function . The terms proportional to in the left-hand side of (88) are the most important in determining the allowed values of : we want to tune such that the number multiplying is as negative as possible. We have looked at a class of smooth functions of the form on the interval , where is the incomplete beta function. Numerical inspection shows that Tardos' choice is the best choice for and . Of course, as we have not investigated the full function space of , this does not prove that is the best possible choice. 5 As can be seen from the accusation rule (2), rescaling g and Z by the same factor leaves the scheme invariant.
In the rest of this paper, we will work with .
G. Last Step in the Proof of Theorem 1
We are now finally in a position to prove Theorem 1. We show that Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 1 in the special case and . In this special case, we have as shown by Lemma 2. Hence, the condition on (27) reduces to (7) . Furthermore, the choice gives (see Appendix I), whereby reduces to , as defined in (8) . Next we use the property to explicitly evaluate the expectation and the term in (88). We make use of expression (35) for and get
This allows us to rewrite (88) as (40)
The quantity in Theorem 1 is specifically chosen such that satisfies (40). The in Theorem 1 is given by (28) after the substitution , , and . Thus, (29) reduces to (9) .
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In the preceding section, we proved a result for large coalition sizes. In this section, we numerically investigate how quickly convergence to this behavior occurs.
A. Method
Given that and are the optimal functions, we determine the optimal values for the remaining parameters. For fixed , our task is to find such that we obtain the smallest possible . We mean "smallest" in the sense that soundness and completeness can be proven using the technique in Section III, but without the assumption that is large. The following constraints must be satisfied.
• From (16) The complicated -dependence of (45), containing a term of the form , prevents us from finding an optimum analytically. Instead, we have searched for optimum parameter values numerically, using a randomized method following these steps.
1) Choose a random uniformly from the interval . 2) Choose uniformly from .
3) Choose uniformly from . 4) Find the largest possible value of in the interval that satisfies condition (45).
5) Compute
. Note that the optimal choice of (in terms of achieving small ) follows from (30). When the optimal value for is used, the interval (30) consists of a single point seen in the last step. We repeat steps 1)-5) multiple times and select the set of parameter values that yield the lowest value of , i.e., the shortest code length.
B. Numerical Results
As the parameter depends on and only through the ratio of their logarithms, we define the parameter to display our results. This allows us to represent dependence on three parameters using only two variables, namely, . As we are primarily concerned with content distribution applications, we have chosen and as plausible values. This gives . We further consider . We plot the best code length parameter as a function of (for constant ) and as a function of (for constant ) in Figs. 1 and 2 , respectively. Note that these figures are derived from the same data set. In Appendix II, we give the corresponding values of the and parameters, which are necessary to implement the fingerprinting scheme. The numerical results indicate that the result (see Corollary 1) seems to be approached for large and small . Moreover, the -dependence of is slightly sublinear. Note that there is not much variation in the value of , only of the order of 15%.
In Fig. 3 , we also plot the results when the FP and FN rates are coupled as in [11] , i.e., or . In this case, it is possible to reduce to approximately , which is not much of an improvement with respect to Tardos' . This result further emphasizes the importance of decoupling FP and FN rates. When we allow for high FN rates , the code can be safely made more than a factor two shorter than suggested in Tardos' original construction. Finally, Figs. 1-3 , together with Appendix II, give a system parameter recipe for content owners who wish to implement a provably -sound and -complete fingerprinting scheme with a code length .
V. STATISTICAL APPROACH
A. Motivation and Main Result of the Statistical Approach
In this section, we put aside the provable properties of the Tardos fingerprinting scheme. Instead, we study the statistical behavior of the accusation sums (1) for the innocent user and (21) for the coalition. The advantage of the statistical approach is that we get more insight into the "true" behavior of the scheme (actual FP and FN probabilities as a function of , , , and ) than provided by the provable result (Theorem 1) based on the Markov inequality.
The accusation sums and are defined as the sum of a large number of stochastic variables. We expect and to have an approximately Gaussian probability distribution. (This is motivated in Appendix III.) The CLT states that a variable that is created by adding up many independent stochastic variables will have a Gaussian distribution in the vicinity of the distribution's peak. The exact size of this "vicinity" depends on the distribution of the individual variables and on the total number of variables in the sum. In Appendix III, we argue that the Gaussian approximation is valid for some realistic values of and .
Our main result can be formulated as follows. is -sound and -complete. Here Erfc stands for the complementary error function , with the definition . The superscript "inv" denotes the inverse function.
Corollary 3:
Let be independent fixed parameters. Then, for , the parameter choice (48) achieves -soundness and -completeness.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the coming sections and has the following outline. First, in Sections V-B and V-C, we compute the lowest moments of the distributions of the accusation sums where is not a colluder (49) Then, in Section V-D, we compute the FP and FN error probabilities as a function of , , and . We derive conditions on and from the soundness and completeness requirements. In Section V-E, we identify an "extremal" strategy that leads to a maximum value of and . In Section V-F, we assume that the probability distributions are Gaussian (a motivation for this step is given in Appendix III) and we combine all the ingredients to complete the final step in the proof of Theorem 2. We prove Corollary 3 in Section V-G.
B. Statistics of an Innocent User's Accusation
Even without knowing the colluders' strategy, we can derive a number of useful properties of the expectation values listed in (49). We start by looking at , where user is not a colluder. In Section II-B, the functions and were introduced such that . This immediately yields (50) where is shifted out of the expectation value because is not part of the coalition. From (50), it immediately follows that . The standard deviation is computed as follows. Substitution of the definition (1) into (49) gives (51) All terms with vanish, since then the expectation value factorizes into two parts that are both zero due to (50). Hence, we can write (52) (Here the expectation involves only those entries in that are visible to the colluders.) Again, we have used the fact that does not depend on when user is innocent. Next we make use of the property that holds for . This finally yields (53)
C. Statistics of the Coalition Accusation
Next we look at the collective accusation sum defined in (21). Now we have to keep in mind that depends on when is a colluder. Taking the expectation of (21), we get (54)
The notation stands for the expectation value over the degrees of freedom for fixed and . In (54), the expectation value over , for fixed , reduces to a binomial distribution on the integers [11] "1" entries in column is (55)
We now evaluate (54) as follows. We express the expectation in the form (55). We define a quantity . Here the notation means the expectation value over all degrees of freedom in and except column . The quantity depends on and the colluder strategy (and possibly explicitly on , if the colluders choose to apply different strategies in different positions); it does not depend on , as the colluders do not have access to . Finally, we substitute Tardos' functions , , and . In this way, after some algebra, we obtain (56)
We now make use of the marking condition, giving and . This allows us to rewrite (56) as (57)
Note that the coalition strategy has an almost negligible effect on . The terms add up to when the full sum is taken, but only the term is of order . All the other terms summed together are only of order . The same argument holds for the other summand, but there the term is dominant.
We use the same methods as above to evaluate . Without showing the details of the computation, we give the result (58)
D. Relating and to the Error Probabilities
In (53), (57), and (58), we see from the -summations that the -dependence becomes very simple if the colluders apply the same strategy in each column; namely, the quantities , , and then all become proportional to . This motivates us to define "scaled" quantities as follows:
(59) Let us introduce the notation and for the probability distribution functions of and , respectively. These functions are unknown to us, but we normalize them so that they have zero mean and unit variance (60) The accusation threshold Z and the desired error rates " and " are also shown. with and . We introduce the cumulative "tail" functions as (61)
With this notation, the error probabilities are expressed as FP error prob.
FN error prob.
(62) This is sketched in Fig. 4 . The left curve is the probability density of the quantity . It has mean and variance (this will be shown in Section V-E). The FP error rate (which should be less than ) is given by the area to the right of the (rescaled) threshold . The right curve is the probability density of the quantity . It has average and variance . The FN error rate is given by the area to the left of . The horizontal axis is scaled such that the -curve does not depend on and . Several important properties follow from this picture.
• For fixed and , increasing beyond affects only the distribution of . The left curve remains unchanged and hence the FP rate is independent of the coalition size. This is compatible with the definition of -soundness (Definition 1). • The FP error rate is determined by one parameter:
. Hence, must be chosen as as far as the dependence on is concerned. • When increases, the rightmost curve becomes narrower and shifts to the left. In order to prevent the center of this curve from crossing the threshold line, we need . Together with the previous point, this illustrates the need for the proportionalities and in the Tardos scheme. More precise results are derived next. Note that is negative on the interval for symmetric , and that it monotonically increases as a function of .
The -interval (63) exists only for sufficiently large . One can think of a region in the -plane, with and , bounded on the lower side by a line and on the upper side by a quadratic function of . The linear and quadratic curves meet each other at (64) This represents the smallest possible code length for which the interval (63) exists, and hence, by Lemma 3, the smallest possible code length for which the code is properly collusion resistant.
E. "Extremal" Colluder Strategy
Equation (64) allows us to find the "worst case" or "extremal" colluder strategy. We define this as the strategy that causes the highest possible value of . Even though the colluders do not necessarily use this strategy, the content owner has to take into account that they might and has to adjust accordingly. We make the following observations.
• One way of increasing would be to make as small as possible. However, in Section V-C, it was shown that the choice of strategy has negligible effect on . • Another way of increasing is to make and as large as possible. Here the choice of strategy has a big impact. Both and are maximally large if the coalition outputs a " " whenever possible. We see that the "extremal" strategy is to set for . (The marking condition enforces
.) It looks as if the colluders are incriminating themselves in those columns where . However, for each symbol, they equally incriminate a fraction of all the other users. The strategy derives its effectiveness from the large number of users who get accused along with the colluders.
Substitution of the extremal strategy into (53) We obtain the following inequalities from (65):
(67)
These are independent of the choice of strategy function . Likewise, from (57), we also obtain an inequality that is independent of . This is done by taking only the negative part of the summand in (57) and setting . The result is (68)
We substitute (66) into (63) and (64), and then use the inequalities (67) and (68). This exercise shows that the choice (46) for is larger than , as it should indeed be, and that the -interval (47) lies within the interval (63). This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
G. Proof of Corollary 3
We use the inequality [12] (69) to prove that the expression in (48) is larger than . Thus, the following code length achieves soundness and completeness:
(70) We then neglect the term containing with respect to , since it is of order . This yields the value of in Corollary 3. Finally, the value of in Corollary 3 follows by substituting this into the left boundary in (47).
Remarks: In the regime , the fraction of logarithms in (70) is typically smaller than (see Section IV). Hence, the asymptotic result is already approached for relatively small values of .
In the case where and are coupled according to , as was done in Tardos' original construction, Corollary 3 does not hold, as we get . Here the fraction of logarithms is not negligible and leads to a factor in instead of .
VI. SUMMARY
We have reevaluated the performance of the Tardos fingerprinting scheme by parameterizing its numerical constants and fixed functions. We have further modified the scheme by decoupling the desired FN and FP error probabilities. Using a proof technique similar to the one in [11] , we have shown how short the code length can be with provable -soundness and -completeness. The main results of our study can be summarized as follows.
• Tardos' accusation function is "optimal" in the sense that it minimizes the provably sufficient code length for our particular choice of proof method.
• Tardos' probability distribution function
is "optimal" in the same sense within a limited class of functions that has the form . • For sufficiently large values, and independent of , the code length can be reduced from Tardos' to approximately . • When , for instance, for content distribution applications, our numerical results show that a code length is achievable already for . • For sufficiently large , the accusation sums for the innocent user and for the coalition have probability distributions that are very close to Gaussian-due to the CLT. If these distributions are perfectly Gaussian, then, in the case of independent and , a code length of is sufficient for achieving -soundness and -completeness.
APPENDIX I CONDITION FOR COMPLETENESS
In this Appendix, we derive an upper bound on the expression . The first part of the derivation is directly copied from [11] , so we will not repeat it here. We start our analysis at the earliest point where the approach with general , , , and deviates from [11] . From partial evaluation of the -average (which involves the binomial distribution for each column of separately) and from , it can be shown that
The term is easily bounded (72) Next it is proven that (for ) some positive expression. To this end, the inequality is again used, which holds for 
Furthermore, we note that the function multiplying the step function in (77) is monotonically decreasing as a function of , provided that is "small enough." (This statement is made more accurate in Section IV.) This means that the expectation value can be upper bounded by evaluating the integrand at the point , the smallest value of where the step function is nonzero with (83)
We introduce a numerical constant such that . (In Tardos' case, .) From the definition of (83), it then follows that (84) This gives us the following bound on for :
(85)
The -sum in (80) can then be bounded as
where we have introduced the abbreviation for the small 6 value . Summarizing, from (80), we obtain (87) 6 As long as does not deviate too much from the Tardos case, 1 is of order >1 in the small parameter .
TABLE I NUMERICAL RESULTS
Finally, we impose the following condition on the parameters and :
where is a numerical constant. The satisfiability of this condition depends on the choice of , , and . Given that the condition is satisfied, we have the upper bound (89) For given and , we will be interested in the smallest value of that can be achieved. Tardos chose and such that . Table I shows the results of the numerical experiments described in Section IV. The values , , and parametrize the code length, accusation threshold, and -axis cutoff, respectively. We also note, for the sake of completeness, that the auxiliary variables take the following values for the parameter sets indicated in the table:
APPENDIX II NUMERICAL RESULTS
, , and .
APPENDIX III GAUSSIAN APPROXIMATION
Under some reasonable assumptions, we can regard the accusation sums as Gaussian-distributed stochastic variables. Here we outline our assumptions and show that the CLT is applicable under these conditions. We first note the complete column symmetry and column independence of both the code generation process and the accusation method. Given this symmetry, we argue (without providing a proof) that the best colluder strategy for generating the colluded copy is also symmetric, i.e., their output is independent of the column index and independent of the entries in the other columns . Note that the "extremal" colluder strategy of Section V-E also complies with this assumption. Given column symmetry and mutual independence of the accusation values, under the assumption of a symmetric colluder strategy, the accusation sums and are sums of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) variables, and the CLT is applicable.
We show that the domain of applicability of the CLT is large enough to encompass a sufficient part of the tail of the and distributions, so that the approximations made in Section V-F are justified. The error probability represents at most an "eight-sigma" event, i.e., we are interested in the region of eight standard deviations around the average of . First, we determine the probability distribution of each separate accusation , for innocent , given that . For infinitesimal , we define (90)
We compute the conditional probability that given . We write , from which it follows that . Using , with defined in (1), we get . Applying the same reasoning to the case , with , yields . From the conditional probability, we obtain by multiplying with the probability that the event (or ) occurs (91) Here we have used the fact that for and for . Thus, the tail of the probability distribution has a power law behavior. Next we argue that the number of contributing terms to (almost terms for the optimal colluder strategy) is sufficiently large for the CLT to cover eight sigmas. For a distribution with vanishing third cumulant and with , it is known (see, e.g., [1] ) that the region of convergence for the CLT, expressed in sigmas, is given by sigmas (92) where is the number of variables summed, and stands for the th cumulant. Our distribution (91) satisfies the requirement because is defined on the finite interval . We have and . Substitution into (92), with , gives sigmas (93)
where we have used and . Hence, the eight-sigma point of the tail is correctly approximated by a Gaussian already at .
